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AN ESSAY ON THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
by EMILY CALHOUN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate about affirmative
action in higher education
underemphasizes a perspective that should lie at the heart of the debate. The
perspective belongs to the professor. For my purposes, it is defined by
professional responsibilities that run directly to each individual student in the
classroom and are intended to ensure that each student has an equal
opportunity to make unfettered choices in the classroom. This essay is
prompted by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Grutter v. Bollinger' and the Supreme Court's grant of a writ of certiorari to
review the validity of conventional diversity justifications for affirmative
action. 2 It attempts to bring the professor's perspective into clearer view and
focuses on justifications for affirmative action on behalf of racial minorities.
As a preliminary matter, I should note that I am not endeavoring to
answer all questions raised by the professor's perspective or to provide a fully
integrated theory of affirmative action that takes the perspective into
account. I fully appreciate that state institutions attempting to implement
and defend affirmative action programs face high burdens of constitutional
justification, but I believe that the perspective of this essay can and should be
integrated into the Supreme Court's constricted affirmative action doctrine.3
I intend, however, to leave it to others to choose to make either the
intellectual attempt or the strategic advocacy moves that might profit from
the perspective I offer here. My modest objective is simply to say something
that needs to be said about the professor's perspective and to suggest ways in
which that perspective might help defend affirmative action programs.'
* Emily Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to
thank Tara Widholm, Jessica Curtis, Jennifer Straus, Mimi Westphalen, and Justin Moore for
their research assistance.
1. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002)(No. 02241).
2. The Court has also agreed to review the decision in Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d
811 (E.D. Mich. 2002), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002)(No. 02-516).
3. See e.g. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action after
the RedistrictingCases, 43 Win. & M. L. Rev. 1569 (2001) (suggesting new ways of thinking about
justifications for affirmative action in higher education); Jed Rubenfeld, The AntiAntidiscrimination Agenda, 111 Yale L.J. 1141 (2002) (discussing current burdens of
justification).
4. Since this essay was written, one scholar has offered an extended analysis of affirmative
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PROFESSOR'S PERSPECTIVE DEFINED

The professor's perspective is informed primarily by the responsibilities
owed to each individual student under a professor's tutelage.5 There are
many ways of thinking about those responsibilities in the higher education
context and, to a certain extent, these thoughts have been incorporated into
the affirmative

action

debate.6

As discussed below, however,

the

implications of these responsibilities for affirmative action have generally
remained on the periphery of the debate.
What are the professional responsibilities that govern the daily work of

each faculty member? My primary point of reference is the principles of
professional responsibility adopted by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP).7
The AAUP emphasizes that each
professor's obligation runs to the individual student, who is entitled to the
benefits of academic freedom. According to the AAUP, students "should be

encouraged to develop the capacity for critical judgment and to engage in a
sustained and independent search for truth."' 8 So that these objectives might
be achieved, the AAUP entitles students "to an atmosphere conducive to

action that might easily incorporate the professor's perspective. See Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Integration,Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195 (2002).
5. The professional responsibility argument made in this essay should be distinguished from
arguments about an institution's responsibility to the larger society or to a profession like law.
See e.g. Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Stand for the Whole: Pluralism and the Law School's
ProfessionalResponsibility, 15 Natl. Black L.J. 1 (1997-98).
6. The professor's point of view and responsibilities to individual students are included, for
example, in Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their FirstPrinciples: Reflections on the
Values of Affirmative Action, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1322 (1999) (reminding that the affirmative
action debate must always be founded on a concern for the individual student); Sanford
Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 592 (2000) (discussing affirmative action as it
relates to the professor's goal of producing a well-educated person with disciplinary expertise, an
ability to interact with curiosity with other and different persons, and the capabilities of a selflearner); and Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping Into the Informational
Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 667 (1994)
(recommending specific pedagogical strategies to accompany minority student enrollment).
Diversity, the focal point of contemporary affirmative action debate, was conceptualized as a
pedagogical justification for affirmative action. See e.g. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978).
7. AAUP Policy Documents and Reports, Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students 141 (1984 ed., AAUP 1968); see also Association of American Law Schools, Statement
of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities,http://www.aals.org/ethic.html (adopted Nov. 17, 1999); cf. National Education
Association, Code of Ethics of the Education Profession, http://www.nea.org/aboutnea/code.html
(adopted 1975). It should be emphasized that the principles discussed in this essay are not taken
from the AAUP's policy on diversity. See American Association of Universities, Diversity
Statement:
On
the
Importance
of
Diversity
in
University
Admissions,
http://www.aau.edu/issues/Diversity4.14.97.html (April 14, 1997); William W. Van Alstyne,
Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An
Unhurried Historical Review, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 79 (1990)(discussing the history and
status of AAUP standards).
8. Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, supra n. 7, at 141.
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learning

and

to

even-handed

treatment. ..

."I

It

recognizes

3

that

"[a]ppropriate opportunities and conditions in the classroom" are necessary

to the "freedom to learn."' 10 Nothing in the instructional role or environment
should force students "to make particular personal choices as to ... his own
part in society."'"

I have no reason to doubt that most professors approve of the
sentiments expressed in the AAUP principles. Professors understand that

12
their relationship with students embodies special, professional obligations.

They endeavor to ensure that each student enjoys the freedom to learn, is
willing and able to participate in classroom discussions as a unique and equal

individual, and has the confidence to take the necessary risks and make the
inevitable mistakes that the acquisition of new knowledge and skills requires.
Professors have not, however, brought their professional obligations fully to
bear on the affirmative action debate.
As I am going to use the preceding precepts of professional
responsibility to justify a strong version of affirmative action in higher
education, it will be useful to consider how they fit with the perspective that
13
typically orients conventional diversity justifications of affirmative action.

The difference in perspective is significant.
Diversity justifications have come to be associated with the argument
that exposure of students to the viewpoints of others is an important
pedagogical objective of affirmative action plans. Universities represent an
intellectual marketplace in which professors and students play with abstract,
pre-formulated ideas. Diversity also serves other ends. For example, it
encourages students to value pluralism, secures interracial harmony, and

9. AAUP Policy Documents and Reports, A Statement of the Association's Council:
Freedom and Responsibility 133, 135 (1984 ed., AAUP 1968).
10. Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, supra n. 7, at 141.
11. A Statement of the Association'sCouncil, supra n. 9, at 135.
12. For example, a professor's obligations to students may trump even a professor's own
(arguable) academic freedom interests. See e.g. Amy H. Candido, A Right to Talk Dirty?:
Academic Freedom Values and Sexual Harassmentin the University Classroom, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 85 (1996-97).
13. Diversity is currently assumed to be the most promising constitutional justification for
race-based affirmative action plans. Universities and their advocates have opted to push
diversity justifications for affirmative action, see William G. Bowen & Derek C. Bok, The Shape
of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University
Admissions (Princeton U. Press 1998), perhaps because remedial justifications have typically not
been persuasive in litigation, see e.g. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 Ohio St. L.J.
669 (1998) (discussing remedial issues in litigation). Some universities do not even attempt to
rely on remedial justifications, compare Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234
(11th Cir. 2001), with Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), although
intervenors may do so, see e.g. Grutter, 188 F.3d 394. Although one of the concurring opinions
in the recent decision validating the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program suggests that a remedial justification might be based on prior racial discrimination in
the educational system as a whole, the university at present relies solely on the diversity
justification. Grutter,288 F.3d at 768 (Clay, J., concurring).
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The objective

commonly associated with diversity justifications for affirmative action plans,
however, is improvement of the marketplace of ideas.
In contrast, a professional responsibility perspective focuses on a
professor's obligation to ensure that each enrolled minority student has
uncoerced and unmanipulated opportunities for intellectual development
and the freedom to make independent decisions. The professor's obligation

works in tandem with fundamental constitutional rights of each minority
student to academic freedom and equality. 15 From this perspective, the
classroom is not an environment characterized solely by principles of social

Darwinism and survival of the best pre-defined, static ideas. It is a place in
which knowledge and students are nurtured and developed under a
professor's tutelage.
The process of learning is dynamic and unpredictable. Furthermore, the
classroom-as-marketplace-of-ideas is an impoverished metaphor for either
that process or for the relationships recognized by the professional
responsibility perspective. It does not suggest ways of thinking about how
individual students learn or about the ground rules under which learning
should occur. Thus, in emphasizing the marketplace of ideas, conventional
diversity theory neglects concerns at the heart of the professional
16
perspective.
14. For representative recent discussions of these goals see Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished
Homework for Universities: Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 54 Wash. U. J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 73 (1998); Bowen & Bok, supra n. 13; John Friedl, Making a Compelling Case for
Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Levinson, supra n. 6; Goodwin Liu,
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest
Test, 33 Har. Civ. Rights Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 381 (1998).
15. An excellent discussion of the relationship between traditional notions of academic
freedom and the Constitution is found in Candido, supra n. 12, and Van Alstyne, supra n. 7
(discussing the substantive due process and liberty roots of academic freedom principles). For
judicial recognition of the link, see e.g. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (linking
participation, choice, and personal growth in an academic environment to rights of association
and equality); cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint
opinion) (explaining that the freedom to define one's own identity through choice is part of the
fundamental concept of individual liberty); see Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical
Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 105, 158 (discussing the goal of
equality to achieve fair participation so that "every individual has the opportunity to gain
dignity, equal self-worth, and respect through the power of self-definition").
16. In Grutter, 288 F.3d at 762-66 (Clay, J., concurring), one judge spoke to this issue and
criticized the dissenters for viewing education as a process in which ideas are simply poured into
an empty vessel. The opinion did not, however, link its view of the educational process to the
obligations explored in this essay.
My quarrel is not fundamentally with diversity justifications, which are subjected to many
ill-founded criticisms. For example, although most affirmative action plans take race into
account as only one relevant factor along with many others to evaluate a prospective student,
opponents frequently claim that race predominates and functions as a proxy for a particular
point of view. See e.g. Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1745, 1762-65 (1996); Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting
the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 521 (2002); Karlan, supra n. 3, at 1596-97. For
thoughtful discussions of potential flaws in diversity arguments, see e.g. Anderson, supra n. 4;
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The neglect is unfortunate because the professional responsibility
perspective prompts a query that has ramifications for the affirmative action
debate. The professor's query is: what measures might one reasonably feel
compelled to adopt so as to ensure that each student - including each
minority student - has the freedom - an equal freedom - to learn? Careful
consideration of this question leads to a justification for strong affirmative
action admissions policies.
III.

RACIAL STEREOTYPING AND THE CRITICAL MASS REMEDY

When I speak of a strong affirmative action admissions policy, I am
thinking of one that seeks to secure what has been called a "critical mass" of
students of color in any given classroom within any given university. A
critical mass argument is a logical outgrowth of the professor's perspective
given what we know will happen in a classroom in which there is not a critical
mass of minority students. For those who are not familiar with research
pertaining to this issue, I provide a brief summary of research, which I trust
does not oversimplify matters.
A. Stereotyping and Token Behaviors
Research suggests that even at current levels of institution-wide
affirmative action, it is statistically inevitable that many minority students will
be "solo" in any given classroom. According to an AAUP study of one
liberal arts college, for example, 66.7% of African-American students were
"solo" in the classroom. 17 Most professors at institutions of higher education
would undoubtedly attest to this fact or at least that the minority student
presence, when it occurs, is frequently a numerically token number.18
Without race-based affirmative action programs, the percentage of "solos" or
tokens would surely rise. 19 Research also suggests that if minority students
are "solo" or token in university classrooms, which have historically been
Friedl, supra n. 14; Levinson, supra n. 6; Liu, supra n. 14; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The
Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,84 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1996).
17. Roxane Harvey Gudeman, College Missions: Faculty Teaching and Student Outcomes in
a Context of Low Diversity, in Does Diversity Make a Difference? Three Research Studies on
Diversity in College Classrooms 49-51 (American Council on Education and American
Association of University Professors 2000)(available at http://www.aaup.org/ Issues/Affirmative
Action/ Archives/2000/DIVREP.PDF (accessed Feb. 20, 2003)).
18. Of course, some small classes, by virtue of professor or subject matter, will draw an
enrollment of more significant numbers of minority students.
19. See e.g. Issacharoff, supra n. 13, at 678 (describing what has happened in universities that
have abandoned affirmative action admissions policies but have retained most other traditional
admissions criteria). The problem is exacerbated by the behavior discussed in this essay, which
influences enrollment choices of minority students. See e.g. Shawn Pompian, Expectations of
Discriminationas a Justificationfor Affirmative Action, 8 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L. 517, 539, 543-44
(2001) (arguing that stereotype anxiety influences choices of opportunities and career paths);
and Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-BasedAffirmative Action, 31 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 213, 244 (1997) (noting examples of how minority students make enrollment
decisions).
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dominated by whites, a given minority student will frequently be perceived as
a stereotyped figure rather than as a unique individual and will experience

demands and pressures that interfere with learning.20

Racial stereotypes are well-learned, ingrained associations - indeed, a
whole set of associations - that are automatically triggered by the fact that a

particular person is of a particular race. 21 One who acts on the basis of a
racial stereotype will assume - perhaps even demand - that stereotyped

persons hold specific beliefs or act in particular ways. A familiar stereotyping
phenomenon is the tendency of members of a racial majority to ask a token
minority student to speak on behalf of a racial group, as in an explicit request
for an African American to please enlighten everyone as to "what Blacks
22

think.'
Stereotyping is, however, more complex than this.

Consider, for

20. Low numbers of a low-status racial group in an environment historically deemed the
exclusive preserve of whites are key variables. See the refinement of Rosabeth Moss Kanter's
work in Janice D. Yoder, Rethinking Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers, 5 Gender & Soc'y
178 (1991). See also Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to be Human in this Place:" The Legal Education
of Twenty Women, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 165, 239-45 (1998) (emphasizing that historical
domination by the majority group exacerbates stereotyping); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity
Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 751 (1998)
(perceiving inequality in status of different racial groups reinforces stereotypes).
Research into stereotyping and token behaviors has focused not only on educational
institutions but also on the workplace, and not only on race but also on gender. For excellent
recent discussions of stereotyping and token effects, see Gudeman, supra n. 17, at 54; Pompian,
supra n. 19; David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1713-17 (2002); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale
L.J. 769 (2002); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 Ind. L.J. 63 (2002). See also Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women
of the Corporation(Basic Books, 1977); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 733, 750-59 (1995); Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-ConsciousPedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S.Cal.
Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 33 (1994); Henry Etzkowitz, Carol Kemelgor, Michael Neuschatz,
Brian Uzzi & Joseph Alonzo, The Paradox of Critical Mass for Women in Science, 266 Sci. 51
(Oct. 7, 1994); Foster, supra n. 115, at 156-58; Friedl, supra n. 14, at 33-36; Linda Greene, Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Twenty Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Prospectsfor the
Realization of Equality in Employment, 18 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 593, 602 (1984) [hereinafter
Greene, Equal Employment Opportunity Law]; Linda Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and
PedagogicalPolitics: Lamentations of an African American Female Law Professor, 6 Berkeley
Women's L.J. 81 (1990-91) [hereinafter Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and PedagogicalPolitics];
Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, Jane Balin, Ann Bartow, & Deborah Lee Stachel, Becoming
Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 78
(1994); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportionson Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios
and Responses to Token Women, 82 Am. J. Soc'y. 965 (1977) [hereinafter Kanter, Some Effects
of Proportions on Group Life]; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 1161, 1193 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 333-34 (1987); Eve Spangler, Marsha
A. Gordon & Ronald M. Pipkin, Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter's Hypothesis, 84
Am. J. Soc. 161 (1978).
21. Armour, supra n. 20, at 759.
22. See e.g. Andrea Guerrero, Silence at Boalt Hall: The Dismantling of Affirmative Action
163-165 (U. of Cal. Press 2002); Crenshaw, supra n. 20, at 40-41.
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example, what will frequently happen when a token minority student
discovers that arguments stereotypically associated with her racial
community are being neglected in classroom debate. If the token minority
student assumes responsibility for enlarging the debate by including these
views, the stereotype that all members of her racial group share the views will
be reinforced and will influence future behavior of other students. Even if
the token minority student does not herself accept the beliefs, she will
become irrevocably associated with them, especially if she must repeatedly
assume responsibility for broadening debate throughout an entire semester
each time a class meets. 23 Or, consider the fact that a token minority
student's participation in classroom discussion may be perceived as
''anomalous or discrepant" unless the participation (or view expressed) fits a
particular stereotype of the way a given racial minority should act or
experience the world. 24 If a token minority student deviates from a
stereotype that dictates how members of her racial group should act, subtle
adverse reactions by stereotyping members of the racial majority may result.
The harms caused by racial stereotyping are significant when measured
against the aspirations and obligations set by the AAUP and similar
professional organizations. 25 Research suggests that racial stereotyping
increases performance pressures and isolates the token minority student,
ultimately restricting the intellectual role of token minority students in the
classroom.
Increased performance pressure stems from what some might call "role
' 26 "role entrapment, '27 or what others might refer
encapsulation,
to as racial
"policing." 2 Stereotypes dictate what behavior and attitudes are acceptable
29
for a token minority student and create a double bind for that student. If
she does not conform to the dictates of stereotype, a token minority student
risks adverse responses. If, on the other hand, she does conform, she
reinforces harmful stereotypes. Performance under these circumstances
becomes especially problematic. The token minority student does not have
the same choices majority students have.30 She cannot test her opinions,
23. See e.g. Gaber, supra n. 20, at 192-93.
24. Gudeman, supra n. 17, at 51. See also, Gaber, supra n. 20, at 191 (noting that women who
speak too much are seen as "pushy"); Yoshino, supra n. 20, at 879-905 (discussing racial
"covering").
25. For a discussion of the significant nature of harms caused by behavior that is similar to
racial stereotyping see the discussion of the effects of peer-to-peer student sexual harassment in
higher education in Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 525 (1987).
26. Yoder, supra n. 20, at 188.
27. Spangler, supra n. 20, at 163.
28. Yoshino, supra n. 20, at 913.
29. For discussions of the double bind, see Crenshaw, supra n. 20; Yoshino, supra n. 20, at
916-19.
30. Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and PedagogicalPolitics,supra n. 20, at 89. Zatz, supra n.
20, also provides numerous examples of the way in which stereotypes impose constraints on
women and minorities. Also see Candido, supra n. 12, for a discussion of how sexual harassment,
seeking to reinforce stereotyped notions of a woman's proper place, interferes with student
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conclusions, or feelings with the same freedom majority students have. She is
thrown off balance by her uncertainty as to which rules of behavior apply
given the double bind imposed by stereotyping and actions taken under these
circumstances become especially risky.31 Thus, token minority students will
be tempted to avoid conflict or controversy,3 2 and this avoidance will operate
to the detriment of those students. This consequence holds true for students
enrolled in all areas of study, as students in any academic discipline need to
be able to challenge prevailing wisdoms, to "take up space" and to "make
mistakes. ' 33 For example, students who wish to question premises, goals,
as
research methods, or the use of human subjects in research, as 3well
4
students enrolled in the humanities or social sciences, will be affected.
Reduced class participation and decreased interaction with professors
are understandable responses to racial stereotyping.35 By isolating himself,
the token minority student can avoid being forced into a behavioral or
attitudinal pigeonhole defined by race and can avoid the double bind of
racial policing. But the isolation itself, as well as the energies that a token
minority student must devote to negotiating appropriate behavior in the
presence of racial stereotyping, will surely detract from academic
36
endeavors.
I am not attempting, in this essay, to establish precisely what

autonomy.
31. See e.g. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 Cornell L.
Rev. 1169, 1193 (1998); Greene, Equal Employment Opportunity Law, supra n. 20, at 609;
Kanter, supra n. 20, at 987-88.
32. Kanter, Some Effects of Proportionson Group Life, supra n. 20.
33. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class
Participation,38 J. Legal Educ. 147, 151 (1988).
34. Cf The suggestion that minorities are skeptical of conventional assumptions of
neutrality, objectivity, and other premises of scientific disciplines, in, e.g., Geoffrey Maruyama &
Jos6 F. Moreno, University Faculty Views About the Value of Diversity on Campus in Does
Diversity Make a Difference? Three Research Studies on Diversity in College Classrooms 10
(American Council on Education and American Association of University Professors 2000)
(available at at http://www.aaup.org/ Issues/Affirmative Action/ Archives/2000/DIVREP.PDF
(accessed Feb. 20,2003)); Crenshaw, supra n. 20.
35. Patricia Marin, The Educational Possibility of Multi-Racial/Multi-Ethnic College
Classrooms, in Does Diversity Make a Difference? Three Research Studies on Diversity in College
Classrooms 68 (American Council on Education and American Association of University
Action/
Issues/Affirmative
http://www.aaup.org/
at at
Professors 2000)(available
Archives/2000/DIVREP.PDF (accessed Feb. 20, 2003)); Gaber, supra n. 20, at 191; Guinier, et
al.,
supra n. 20, at 78 n.212. See also, Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword:Race, Multiculturalism,
and the Jurisprudenceof Transformation,47 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 842-43 (1995) (describing a class
in which minorities were numerically dominant and were more vocal, more willing to share life
experiences, more willing to articulate their misgivings about prevailing doctrine and theory,
more willing to disagree with each other and with the professor, more willing to talk about their
own racism and about conflicts between conmnunities of color). Cf Greenberg, supra n. 16, at
557-62, for comments on the unique social isolation with which African Americans contend.
36. As others note, expectations defined by racial stereotypes may become self-fulfilling. See
Pompian, supra n. 19. Cf.David Benjamin Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative Action, 23
Hastings Const. L.Q. 921, 952 (1996) (discussing how expectations become self-fulfilling
prophecies).

9
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consequences flow from racial stereotyping. 7 The critical point is simply that
the classroom with token minority representation is not an "atmosphere
conducive to learning [by] and to even-handed treatment"'3 , of minority
students, but one in which there is less "freedom to learn,"3 9 less freedom of

"personal choice [regarding the student's] own part in society"40 than is
enjoyed by majority students. These harms are not evidence of psychological
weaknesses of persons of any specific race. They would be experienced by
any student who is a token member of a perceived low-status racial group in
41
an environment historically deemed the preserve of another racial group.
The harms are the product of predictable human behaviors under specified
conditions.
B. The CriticalMass Remedy: An Effective and ProportionalResponse to the
Harms of Racial Stereotyping

So, the question for the professor is: what is an appropriate response to
racial stereotyping given professional responsibilities to provide an
environment in which every student has an equal freedom to learn? My
argument is that a professor attuned to the fiduciary-like obligations
recognized by the AAUP is likely to prefer a remedial (or preventive)
approach that attempts to eliminate the structural conditions in which racial

stereotyping flourishes rather than an approach that relies on after-the-fact
responses to individual incidents of racial stereotyping.4 2

A strong

37. There are, of course, gaps in research, in part because current research into the effects of
diversity in universities asks questions pertinent to diversity goals but not always to the problem
addressed in this essay. For discussions of research into diversity justifications, see. Friedl, supra
n. 14; and Killenbeck, supra n. 6. Yoder, supra n. 20, at 189-90, suggests directions that
additional research into stereotyping could take.
38. See supra n. 9.
39. See supra n. 7.
40. See supra n. 9.
41. It is essential to emphasize the latter point in order to avoid the mistake made by the
court in Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), which rejected the Boston Latin
School's critical mass argument because it believed the argument was based on a stereotyped,
racist assumption that racial minorities are less able to express themselves than majority
students. See the similar mistake made by Judge Boggs in Grutter,288 F.3d at 803-06 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting), infra n. 64-65, and the accompanying text.
42. Universities may be hesitant to base arguments for affirmative action on recognition of
fiduciary relationships that might ultimately expose them to liability, for example, for
educational malpractice, but most courts have apparently rejected claims based on alleged
fiduciary relationships. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University's
Implied Obligationsof Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 Md. L. Rev. 183 (2000). In any event,
liability exposure is not a necessary consequence of incorporating a professor's point of view into
the affirmative action debate, just as liability may exist even ifnot driven by the professor's point
of view. Cf.The Supreme Court's rejection of arguments against imposing a Title IX duty on
recipients of federal funds to respond to student-to-student sexual harassment in Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Professors have substantial control over their
classrooms and the way in which student discussion and participation occurs. They can, through
their conduct, either permit or attempt to prevent racial stereotypes from being incorporated
into the classroom. Whether this control is a sufficient basis for recognizing a fiduciary
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affirmative action program - i.e., one that takes race into account as a factor
a critical mass of minority
in admissions decisions so as to eventually secure
43
students in each classroom - will be desirable.
This approach will be preferred for a variety of reasons. For one thing,
the approach is effective. 44 If a certain number of students of color exists in
any given classroom, many of the pernicious behaviors described above can
be avoided. Indeed, a certain number of minority students may be a
prerequisite to ensuring that stereotypes are confronted, that people do not
yield to the tempting but morally indefensible practice of seeing all minority45
students as fungible, and that the effects of stereotyping are minimized.
relationship per se, it should be sufficient to require institutions receiving federal funds under
Title VI not to be deliberately indifferent to the phenomenon of racial stereotyping.
43. The critical mass argument is not a subterfuge for the type of quota arguments
historically rejected by courts. See e.g. Wessman, 160 F.3d at 794 (1st Cir. 1998). Numbers will
be used simply to estimate how many minority students are needed to minimize racial
stereotyping and token effects, and opinions differ on this issue. See, e.g., Kanter, supra n. 20, at
208-09, (estimating critical mass at 15-20%); Marin, supra n. 35, at 68 (noting underrepresented
groups can form a "sympathetic identity" that crosses racial and ethnic lines and functions like a
group-specific critical mass does); Maruyama & Moreno, supra n. 34, at 20, (reporting 30% of
faculty respondents said that a critical mass would represent 16-25% of any given class; 30% said
that greater numbers would be required; and 40% said that a critical mass might be achieved
with fewer than 16%). The real issue is not numerical. See e.g. Lawrence, supra n. 35, at 841
(stating critical mass is defined with reference to whether students "can experience some of the
safety and nurturance of homeplace ... [whether] students are confident that there is enough
common cause, enough trust, enough good will, enough shared experience and understanding to
enable them to confront the most difficult conflicts within and between communities and to
address the hardest issues of ideology and strategy"). For purposes of this essay, an affirmative
action critical mass represents the point at which race-based assumptions are difficult to sustain,
behavioral interactions shift, and individual minority students are not limited by racial policing
but are equally free to challenge intellectual traditions, take risks, make mistakes, and learn with
the freedom taken for granted by majority students. The inquiry is as precise as that applied to
majority-minority political districting, see e.g. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), where
numerical or other objective criteria for drawing the proper line do not exist. See Karlan, supra
n. 3, at 1595-96.
44. See Anderson, supra n. 4, at 1224 (addressing the difficulty of eliminating racial
stereotyping without increasing numbers of minorities); Cf. Armour, supra n. 20 (increasing
minority representation on juries is one of the most efficacious ways of dealing with the problem
of stereotyping); and Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001) (describing how second-generation workplace
discrimination - subtle, nuanced, the product of aggregate instances of bad behavior - can be
eliminated in the workplace, but premising recommendations on the existence of sufficient
numbers of workers to effect change).
45. See e.g. Gudeman, supra n. 17, at 45, 50 (according to faculty respondents, a critical mass
of students of color is necessary to increase class participation of these students); Marin, supra n.
35, at 68 (a certain proportion of students of color is needed to ensure that stereotypes are
confronted); Maruyama & Moreno, supra n. 34, at 29 (faculty generally agree that students of
color are more likely to participate in classroom discussions if there are peers from the same
racial or ethnic group in the same class); and Elizabeth Mertz, Wamucii Njogu & Susan
Gooding, What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J.
Legal Educ. 1, 67 (1998) (if there is a larger percentage or cohort of minority students, more
participation is observed in the classroom; once an unspecified critical mass is reached, there is
no increased impact on participation).
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Increasing the number of minority students in each classroom is not a
complete solution, because a number of factors play into stereotyping and
token effects,46 but numbers do change the classroom dynamic and the
discrimination equation. An anti-discrimination, critical mass effort can
certainly be pedagogically defended as an important part of an affirmative
47
action program.
In comparison, reactive responses to the problem of racial stereotyping
are less satisfactory. The fundamental problem is that they leave in place the
structural condition under which racial stereotyping flourishes. In other
words, minority students continue to be token or "solo," which means they
do not have the support of others indispensable to success in countering
racial stereotyping and avoiding token behavior. 48 A change in formal rules
of behavior and disapproval of specific incidents of stereotyping by a
professor in charge of a classroom, without additional support, are unlikely to
adequately address racial stereotyping and its effects. Racial stereotyping
affects even people of good intentions and few prejudices. 49 It is a common
46. Kanter, supra n. 20, took the position that increasing numbers would solve the problems
associated with stereotyping. As Yoder, supra n. 20, shows, the issue is more complicated. See
e.g. Gudeman, supra n. 17, and Marin, supra n. 35, at 63 (faculty pedagogy also matters); Taunya
Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom,38 J. Legal Educ. 137 (even though there are many
women in law classes, there are still problems of alienation, isolation, and participation);
Etzkowitz, supra n. 20, at 52 (departments with a critical mass of women still have problems
when women are separated by sub-field specialties and dispersed into male-dominated research
groups); Gaber, supra n. 20 (other factors that matter are the existence of informal support
networks, whether faculty know what to do with increased numbers of students, and how many
faculty of color are present); Guinier, et aL, supra n. 20, at 78 n. 210 (women still experience
numerous problems in the classroom, because of the phenomenon of "virtual tokenism," which
exists when there are few women in the elite professorial ranks); Mertz, et al., supra n. 45 at 8586 (classroom participation is affected by a number of factors, not numbers alone); Wildman,
supra n. 33, at 149 (even when women approach fifty percent of those in a given classroom, there
are differences in participation rates); and Yoshino, supra n. 20, at 880 (individuals have
different coping strategies for dealing with the double bind of stereotyping).
Some researchers caution that increasing the numbers of minority students can
exacerbate problems. See e.g. Hallinan, supra n. 20, at 751 (inter-group contact can increase
stereotypes unless handled properly); and Yoder, supra n. 20, at 184 (when numbers increase so
significantly that the presence of a minority group is felt as a threat to the majority group, there
can be an increase in informal barriers in the workplace, e.g., promotion or pay). If significant
numbers of minority students do generate these spillover effects, universities will need to be in a
position to respond to them; but a fear that such effects might appear at some time in the future
is no reason to avoid seeking a critical mass of minority students to overcome current
stereotyping.
47. See the recognition of this fact in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996)
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W. D. Va. 1991) and commenting that a
"critical mass" of women students - estimated at 10%-might be needed for any individual
woman to have a positive educational experience at VMI).
48. For excellent discussions of the type of support needed to eliminate discrimination, see
Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative
Perspective (University of Chicago Press 1998); Sturm, supra n. 16.
49. See Armour, supra n. 20, at 757. A quick perusal of articles giving practical advice to
professors on how to conduct classes so as to counteract effects of discrimination will give
anyone a good idea of what would be entailed by this project. See e.g. Roach, supra n. 6, and
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event, and constant attention is required to counter it. Effective monitoring
by a single individual is thus a practical impossibility.
Finally, even if a professor could discern precisely how stereotypes are
operating in a given classroom or for specific students, constant faculty
monitoring over the course of a semester to ferret out and address racial
stereotyping in each class might have unintended, adverse consequences for
solo or token minority students enrolled in a particular class. Although a
specific response to a particularly blatant incident of racial stereotyping
would typically not be problematic, persistent intervention might only
emphasize the presence and predicament of the token minority student. This
in turn, has potential to isolation and performance pressure. And, it is highly
likely that persistent intervention would be perceived as political correctness
run amok and antithetical to the First Amendment.5 0
The reality is that no individual effort by a professor is likely to be as
successful in solving the problem of racial stereotyping and token effects as a
critical mass of minority students in that professor's classroom. And, once a
critical mass of minority students is achieved, a professor's efforts at
countering lingering racial stereotyping or token effects will be more
fruitful.51
Ineffective responses are unacceptable to a professor because of the
serious nature of the conduct and harms at issue. When it occurs under
circumstances that produce a denial of equality, racial stereotyping is classic
discrimination based on race. And the harms of racial stereotyping interfere
with fundamental rights of academic freedom.
Majority students (or professors) who employ racial stereotypes treat
minority students in a certain way simply "because of" their race. Of course,
racial stereotyping is not always easy to identify. It can be extremely
nuanced as well as blatant. It can taint the conduct of persons who have the
best intentions but are steeped in race-based norms, as well as the conduct of
overt racists who wholeheartedly embrace the stereotype for malicious ends.
Moreover, each individual incident of racial stereotyping does not necessarily
deny equality. For these reasons - because racial stereotyping is frequently
not overt, because penalties for behaving against stereotype are nuanced and

Wildman, supra n. 33.
50. See e.g. the debate about hate speech, exemplified by Steven G. Gey, The Case Against
Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 193 (1996); Richard Delgado, Are Hate
Speech Rules ConstitutionalHeresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865 (1998). For
an interesting comparison of issues raised by campus speech codes and diversity-justified
affirmative action, see Chi Steve Kwok, A Study in Contradiction: A Look at the Conflicting
Assumptions Underlying Standard Arguments for Speech Codes and the Diversity Rationale,4 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 493 (2002).
51. I am reminded of an account of a stereotyping incident related to me by an expert with
over twenty years of experience in international and domestic mediation. The mediator told me
that she still cannot figure out a good way to handle the problem of racial stereotyping when
there is only one person of color in a small training class. I am sure that other teachers share this
mediator's frustration and breathe a sigh of relief whenever they find more than token minority
representation in their classrooms.
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subtle, because even people without malicious intentions employ stereotypes,
and because it is only in the aggregate and over time that the significant
nature of the harm of racial stereotyping may become manifest - one might
be tempted to assume that persistent racial stereotyping is something other

than classic, intentional racial discrimination. This is a mistake.52
Although it has not clearly articulated a theory that brings racial
stereotyping within the ambit of constitutional prohibitions on intentional
discrimination, the Supreme Court reacts strongly against structures and
practices that permit stereotyping. 3 In a variety of contexts, the Court has
identified stereotyping as the objectionable feature of behavior.5 4 "Even if

some statistical support can be conjured up for" a stereotype, behavior based
on that stereotype - for example, sex-based decisions to exclude potential
jurors - do not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 55 Programs based on
customary, ingrained stereotypes of roles deemed appropriate for men or
52. Zatz, supra n. 20, provides an excellent discussion of how stereotypes entail
discrimination. Influenced perhaps by discussions of unconscious discrimination, e.g. Lawrence,
supra n. 20, there is a tendency on the part of some to assume that racial stereotyping is not
unconstitutional, intentional racial discrimination. Certainly stereotyping does not neatly fit
within current doctrinal categories. See Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury, & John David
Skrentny, PassingStrict Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs,90
Geo. L. J. 835, 838-39 (2002); and Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of
Bias: On Devaluationand BiasedPrototypes, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 747 (2001). But the Supreme Court
has many ways of defining "intent." See e.g. Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L.
Rev. 1065 (1998); Schwartz, supra n. 20; Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:The
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279 (1997); and Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (1989). Even ingrained (or so-called
unconscious) racial stereotyping may qualify as intent-based within the meaning of the
Constitution.
53. For reminders that the law may also promote stereotyping, see Kristin Bumiller, The
Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims 62 (Johns Hopkins University Press
1988) (women must portray themselves as victims in order to establish liability under many civil
rights laws); and Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 35-36 (2000) (pointing out that legal terminology and
doctrine itself reinforces stereotypes in many subtle ways).
54. The Court's abhorrence of stereotyping is commensurate with the view that stereotyping
constitutes a serious moral error insofar as it treats individuals of a given race as fungible. John
T. Noonan, Jr., The Antelope: The Ordeal of the Recaptured Africans in the Administrations of
James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (University of California Press 1977) illustrates the
point. The Antelope is an account of a judicial proceeding instituted to determine the status of a
group of Africans rescued from a pirate ship off the coast of Florida. Some of the Africans were
known to be free persons, although the identity of the specific Africans entitled to freedom was
not known. Others were known to be slaves, although the identity of the specific Africans held
as slaves was not known. One proposal for deciding which Africans should go free and which
should be returned to slavery involved, essentially, flipping a coin. Although law imposes
significant burdens on the ability of one person to deprive another of personal liberty, Africans implicitly considered to be less than human - were casually considered fungible when
fundamental liberty was at stake. See also Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 125 (Yale
University Press 1990) (noting lotteries permit people to be willfully ignorant of relevant facts
which is the root of passive injustice).
55. See e.g. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130 n. 11 (1994) (disapproving the use of gender
stereotypes in jury selection).
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women, such as the nursing program challenged in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, are invalidated,5 6 as are those based on stereotyped

notions of what pedagogical practices are suited to women.5 7 Laws that
enforce stereotypes about the unacceptability of interracial marriage are held
unconstitutional, 58 as are laws that create legislative districts likely to
promote the stereotyped notion that only African-American legislators can
adequately represent African-American citizens. 9 Employment practices

that penalize women for not acting in accordance with stereotypes of
appropriate behavior for women are declared unlawful. 60 In discussing
affirmative action programs in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, Justice Powell adopted a test of constitutionality that turned on
61
whether a given program would foster racial stereotypes.

Not only is racial stereotyping pernicious, "vile" conduct. 62

It causes

harm to fundamental rights of academic freedom. AAUP obligations are in
place to protect that constitutionally-grounded freedom.63 A critical mass,
affirmative action effort to eliminate racial stereotyping and its significant
consequences for the academic freedom of minority students is appropriate.
IV. USING THE PROFESSOR'S PERSPECTIVE TO BUTTRESS JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Arguments in support of a critical mass of minority students are not new
to the affirmative action debate. 64 The difficulty is that previous critical mass
56. 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
57. See e.g. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 556-58.
58. See e.g. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
59. See e.g. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642.
60. See e.g. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), affd, Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Such is also the fate of workplace behavior that
penalizes men for deviating from stereotypes of appropriate male behavior. See e.g. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Although the Supreme Court did not adopt a
stereotyping theory to explain its decision in Oncale, lower courts have subsequently seen that
such a theory is the logical consequence of the decision. See Schwartz, supra n. 20, at 1742-43,
1789-90.
61. 438 U.S. 265,298 (1978) (Powell, J.).
62. See James Boyd White, What's Wrong With Our Talk About Race? On History,
Particularity,and Affirmative Action, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1927 (2002)(stereotyping is not just a
benign mistake).
63. See supra n. 7-11, 15-16 and accompanying text.
64. For example, in Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), it was argued that a critical mass of minority
students was needed to ensure that students were socially comfortable rather than isolated and
would, therefore, make the desired contribution to the law school's educational mission. Gabriel
J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights. J. 881,
921 (1996) (quoting from the Hopwood transcript). See also the Brief of Amici Curiae American
Council on Education et al., at 19, Board of Education of Township of Piscataway v. Taxman,
522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (No. 96-679) (more than a few minority students were needed in classrooms
because "10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other
the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States");
Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746-47; and Wessman , 160 F.3d at 796-99.
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arguments are insufficiently informed by the professor's perspective.
Grutter v. Bollinger65 provides a good example of one deficiency in
previous critical mass arguments. In Grutter, the University of Michigan
argued that a critical mass of minority students was important because it
would ensure both the variety of viewpoints necessary for a good diversity
program that minority students would contribute and participate in class, and
that minority students would neither feel isolated nor as obliged
spokespersons for their race. 66
The argument reflects points made in this essay. It is, however,
incomplete. Although the University took the position that a critical mass of
minority students is necessary to ensure that those students are not pressured
to be racial spokespersons and will participate in class - i.e., the University
discussed token effects - it did not emphasize why the pressure exists. It
underplayed the problem of racial stereotyping. This is a significant flaw in
the argument, with significant consequences.
If the cause of token effects is not emphasized, the link between the
race-based affirmative action remedy and the race-based problem of racial
stereotyping is obscured, if not entirely eliminated. For purposes of
constitutional argument, of course, the link needs to be emphasized, but the
link is also important to the professor. In its absence, opponents of
affirmative action find it too easy to mis-characterize the problem with which
professors wrestle. If the cause is omitted, discussion tends to focus on the
behavior and psychology of minority students, rather than on the behavior
and psychology of majority students. Argument tends to degenerate into an
offensive discussion of whether minority students are somehow
psychologically weak instead of exploring what can be done to avoid racial
stereotyping by majority students (and others). For example, in Grutter,
Judge Boggs interpreted the argument that a critical mass of minority
students was needed to prevent isolation as an argument bearing on the
"psychological makeup" of minority students. 67 Although the defenders of
affirmative action did not intend to ascribe a psychological weakness to
minority students, their argument was framed so as to enable Judge Boggs to
dismiss it as one that Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr., would
have shunned. 68
Any professor attempting to find ways to dispel pernicious racial
stereotypes cannot afford to have this particular stereotype - of a disabling
personal weakness that connotes a lesser personhood - associated with
affirmative action efforts. For such a professor, it is essential to locate the
problem accurately in the behaviors and beliefs of majority students and

65. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002)(No. 02241).
66. Id. at 737.
67. Id. at 805 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
68. Id. The court in Wessman reacted similarly to a critical mass argument that omitted to
include stereotyping as the cause of token effects. 160 F.3d 790.
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69

others who use racial stereotypes.
Judge Boggs's opinion points to another consequence of failing to

import the professor's perspective into diversity justifications for affirmative
action. In Boggs's world, harms to token minority students operate solely in
the emotional or psychological arena, and those harms are treated as trivial.70

For professors whose interactions with students are guided by AAUP
principles and informed by a well-honed understanding of the dynamics of
classroom behavior when minority students constitute only a token presence,
the harms calling for a race-oriented solution are anything but trivial.
Consisting of a fundamental inequality in academic liberties of minority
students, an inequality caused by racial discrimination, the harms have a
moral and a constitutional dimension.71 Proponents of diversity-oriented
affirmative action typically remind courts that they should give deference to

pedagogical choices because of constitutionally-grounded principles of
academic freedom.72 And, universities sometimes assert that they possess an

institutional academic freedom to adopt affirmative action policies.7 3 But
these arguments do not emphasize the personal autonomy and academic
freedom of minority students that should be at the heart of the affirmative
action debate.

The greatest significance of the professor's perspective is that it focuses
on enrolled minority students and measures their harms by the extent to
69. Proponents of affirmative action are continually pressed to refute the charge that
affirmative action plans stigmatize or stereotype racial minorities. See e.g. Girardeau A. Spann,
The Law of Affirmative Action: Twenty-five years of Supreme Court Decisions on Race and
Remedies 173 (New York University Press 2000); and Greenberg, supra n. 16 at 582-87.
70. Much has been written about the tendency of courts to devalue emotional harms. See
e.g. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev.
463 (1998). Cf the harms of workplace sexual harassment, which were once treated similarly.
No longer do courts dismiss workplace sexual harassment claims because of a perception that
complaining women are weak or overly emotional in their reactions to harassment. Now, the
focus is on the structural conditions that present obstacles to the strong as well as to the weak.
See Harrisv. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993).
71. See supra n. 7-11, 15-16, and accompanying text. Cf. Judge Boggs's dissent in Grutter,
which remarks in passing that the University of Michigan had not "promote[d] the potential for
moral education in racial tolerance created by a more diverse student body" as a justification for
its affirmative action plan. Boggs suggested that, were the University to have as its goal racial
tolerance, "the mere presence of minority students may indeed be sufficient to enhance the
educational experience." Grutter, 288 F.3d at 789 (Boggs, J., dissenting). I doubt that Boggs had
my perspective in mind when he made these comments, but one could read him to be saying that
race might permissibly be used in making admissions decisions if the goal were to promote the
potential for moral interactions - interactions (from my perspective) in which members of
certain racial groups are not treated as fungible. See supra n. 54.
72. See e.g. the Br. of Amici Curiae American Council on Education et al. at 13-14;
Piscataway, 522 U.S. 1010 (No. 96-679); Liu, supra n. 14, at 439 n. 268; Note: An Evidentiary
Frameworkfor Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1357
(1996); and Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication
Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 Yale L.J. 639 (1992).
73. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943, in which the court was not sympathetic to the university's
attempt to rely on a First Amendment argument to serve its own interests. According to the
court, the First Amendment protects individual, not institutional, rights.
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which AAUP-defined obligations - running to enrolled minority students
and intended to protect fundamental rights - are satisfied. 74 Whether one
thinks of racial stereotyping as classic race-based conduct or not,7 race-based

affirmative action programs attempting to eliminate disadvantages to
enrolled minority students are proportionate and proper responses to such
conduct and harms. 76 In order to eliminate conditions in which racial
74. In the professor's perspective, those minority students who would otherwise be racial
tokens and treated as fungible with respect to their points of view and intellectual contributions
are the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action. Minority students admitted pursuant to the
affirmative action plan as well as white students whose educational experience improves from
the creation of a critical mass of minority students in the classroom are secondary beneficiaries.
In contrast, in conventional diversity arguments, benefits of affirmative action are said to flow
primarily and equally to both minority and majority students. For example, one amicus brief in
Grutter argues that a critical mass of students is needed to dismantle stereotypes so that majority
students will see that there is no minority viewpoint. Brief for the Clinical Legal Education
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 16-17, Grutter, 288 F.3d 732 (No. 011447). If minority students censor themselves and speak only as representatives of the minority
community, "the opportunity to hear, challenge and learn from differing perspectives is lost." Id.
at 11. Of course, stereotyping by majority students will be limited in the presence of a critical
mass of minority students, and one can refer to this as a benefit to majority students, but surely
the primary benefit is to minority students. For other diversity arguments which tend to focus on
majority rather than minority student benefits, see the Brief of Amici Curiae American Council
on Education et al., at 20, Piscataway, 522 U.S. 1010 (No. 96-679); and the Brief of Charles A.
Wright, Douglas Laycock & Samuel Issacharoff as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 7
- 13, Piscataway,522 U.S. 1010 (No. 96-679).
As Karlan, supra n. 3, at 1602, notes, conventional remedial justifications for affirmative
action must be stretched if the minority students being admitted through the diversity program
are themselves seen as the primary beneficiaries of the plan. If minority students who would be
token or "solo" without an affirmative action plan are primary beneficiaries, the remedial
argument looks very different.
75. See supra nn. 53-62. My argument is not about racial stereotyping per se, but there are
other advantages to giving racial stereotyping special attention in the affirmative action debate.
For example, when racial stereotyping is omitted from the argument, advocates of race-based
affirmative action plans relinquish at least one valid response to arguments that there is no limit
to the number of groups that might claim "diversity" status for purposes of affirmative action.
See e.g. Judge Boggs, dissenting in Grutter, 288 F.3d at 794-95 (Boggs, J., dissenting), echoing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (inquiring about what criteria
should be used for determining which groups should be singled out for special, critical mass
treatment). Levinson, supra n. 6, has a good discussion of this issue. If problems of racial
stereotyping and token behavior only arise with respect to low-status racial groups in
circumstances in which there is a history of white domination of the environment, see supra n. 20,
and accompanying text, there is a valid way of distinguishing among groups for which a critical
mass is sought. White, supra n. 62, argues that justifications for affrimative aciton on behalf of
African Americans are the most compelling.
76. It is possible that, despite the many Supreme Court decisions invalidating conduct based
on stereotypes, supra nn. 52-60, and accompanying text, courts will wish to see stereotyping as
equivalent only to general societal discrimination that is not recognized as a valid reason for
race-based remedial measures. See e.g. Wessman, 160 F.3d 790. If the argument is presented
properly, however, courts should see that, although stereotyping may be both pervasive and a
legacy of prior history, each instance of stereotyping is current, identifiable race-based conduct,
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 909, that, when sufficiently severe, denies equality. See White, supra n. 62
(arguing for particularity in analysis, and that stereotyping can be viewed as state action); Ian
Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative
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stereotyping flourishes, race is used to increase the number of minority
students in classrooms. Enrolled minority students who would otherwise be

token or "solo", and therefore subjected to the pressures and demands of
racial stereotyping described above, are put in a classroom that - thanks to
the affirmative action plan - offers equal opportunities for intellectual
development.
The professional obligations to students that dictate my life in the

classroom suggest that advocates of affirmative action plans might properly
and advantageously adjust their arguments in a modest way. The obligations
of professors respecting minority students should carry a fair bit of weight

insofar as they derive from a set of concerns that stress fundamental,
individual constitutional rights.
Reminding courts of a professor's
obligations should also dispel suspicions that professors are interested in
racial quotas or numbers for the sake of numbers. Instead, professors are
seeking the most effective way of ensuring that the classroom is not
structured to subject minority students to pernicious racial stereotyping and
educational disadvantage.
For the professor, the practical and ethical advantages of having a

critical mass of minority students in the classroom cannot be denied.
Although a critical mass will not in and of itself eliminate all racial
discrimination, it is truly the sine qua non to the elimination of that
discrimination, the condition without which race-based behavior will surely
not be eliminated. Most important, after-the fact, reactive approaches to the

problem do not comport with professional obligations. Like any person in a
position of special trust, a professor should anticipate and act to prevent

harm to those to whom her professional obligations run.

She will not

discharge her professional responsibilities if she waits to respond
retroactively to incidents of racial stereotyping. A professor committed to
developing every student's capacity for critical judgment and to providing an
educational environment that will not force any student into an intellectual

pigeonhole will want to have more than a token racial minority presence in
the classroom. She will want to take affirmative action.

Action, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1577 (1998)(discussing when government's passive participation in
private discrimination becomes a cause of that discrimination). Even if racial stereotyping is
viewed as unintentional conduct with a discriminatory effect, one might justify a race-based
response as an effort to comply with Title VI. See Hunt, 517 U.S. at 915 (suggesting that
compliance with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act may constitute a compelling state
interest justifying race-based districting decisions). Cf. Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (discussing
affirmative obligations of recipients of federal funds to respond to student-to-student
harassment).
For general accounts of the ways in which affirmative action can work to prevent ongoing
racial discrimination, see e.g. Hallinan, supra n. 20, at 733 (one of the three goals of affirmative
action is to counter present discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest:
Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 757, 772 (1997) (the true goal of racial diversity is
to stop racism); and Liu, supra n. 14, at 413 (the desire for diversity is, in part, justified as a
compellingly moral means of combating the evil of private prejudice).

